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“What is common to many is taken least care of, for all 
men have greater regard for what is their own than for 
what they possess in common with others.”  
– Aristotle 
 
Western water rights are unlike any other real property interest because 
they are a usufructuary right.  Thus, a water right holder has a right to 
use, but does not own, the corpus of the water.  This makes water rights 
similar in some ways to intellectual property.  As a result of this unique 
character, the muddle that currently exists in takings jurisprudence is 
further exacerbated when applied to water right takings claims.  This 
muddle highlights the pressing need to safeguard excessive, 
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s ability to take private 
property in the form of water rights. 
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I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN WATER 
RIGHTS 
 
Water scarcity in the western states led to the development of the 
water law doctrine of prior appropriation.1  The Americans moving into 
these arid lands created a new system of water law to replace the English 
common law doctrine of riparian rights used in the eastern states.2  The 
riparian system, which had been imported to the eastern states from 
England, was not suitable to the arid West because it restricted water use 
to land adjacent to streams.3  In the West, where water was scarce and 
often located some distance from where it was needed, the miners and 
agricultural water users required a system that would allow water to be 
diverted and used on both riparian and non-riparian lands.  The prior 
                                                           
1. ROBERT EMMET CLARK ET AL., 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS: A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS & ALLIED PROBLEMS: EASTERN, WESTERN, 
FEDERAL § 405,40–41 (1972). 
2. Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water 
Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 
861, 865, 868 (2001).  
3. 2 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN 
WESTERN STATES 1 (1974). 
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appropriation doctrine followed naturally from the miners’ customs for 
claiming mineral lands.4 
 As with mining claims, the first person to divert water and put it 
to a beneficial use acquired a property right to the amount of water 
diverted.  This principle of priority is sometimes referred to as “first in 
time, first in right,” and it determines the priority (order) in which water 
rights are used.5 A second principle of the prior appropriation doctrine is 
the beneficial use rule, which requires that a water right be put to a 
beneficial use. This rule of beneficial use prohibits waste and speculation 
in the arid West where water is a scarce resource. In short, western 
appropriation water rights differed fundamentally from eastern riparian 
water rights due to contrasting geographical conditions that dictated a 
different approach to allocating water among private users. Territorial and 
state courts of the West legitimized this approach as the prior appropriation 
doctrine while generally rejecting the riparian doctrine.6  Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming all established legal systems based on prior 
appropriation as either a complete replacement for, or in addition to, the 
traditional common law riparian rights system of law.7 
 Before 1890, water law in the West emphasized absolute property 
rights in water.8  However, some leaders in the development of western 
water law considered water a unique resource in which the public’s interest 
should take precedence over private property rights.  Elwood Mead, who 
observed the Colorado system of appropriation of water rights in the 
                                                           
4. TERRY LEE ANDERSON, BRANDON SCARBOROUGH, LAWRENCE R. 
WATSON, TAPPING WATER MARKETS, 29 (2012). 
5.  Carolyn F. Burr, A Survey of Water Rights Title Review in the Six 
Western States, 52 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. IN. (2006); ROBERT EMMET CLARK ET AL., 1 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS & ALLIED 
PROBLEMS: EASTERN, WESTERN, FEDERAL 61 (1967). 
6. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 41.  A few states, notably California, 
Oregon, and Washington, adopted dual systems which recognized both riparian and 
appropriation rights.  The dual system continues to function, albeit poorly, in 
California. 
7. Morriss, supra note 2, at 865. 
8. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, Fishing for Property 
Rights to Fish, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce 
Yandle eds., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1993). 
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making, was the first water engineer for the state of Wyoming.  Mead was 
the chief architect of the Wyoming system, which the Wyoming legislature 
adopted in 1890.9  The Wyoming system included provisions in the state 
constitution and water code that provided for subordination of an 
appropriator to the welfare of the state.10 
 Mead built these provisions into Wyoming’s water law because 
he feared that water would be monopolized without them.  The Wyoming 
doctrine influenced other western states,11 but most states did not adopt it 
in its entirety.  Rather, the states tailored their water law systems to their 
particular circumstances and preferences.  
 Notably, many states rejected the notion of subordinating private 
rights to the public welfare and instead followed Colorado in establishing 
that the public owned the water subject to individual rights of 
appropriation.12  In his water law treatise, Robert Emmett Clark 
summarized the western system: 
 
[I]n western jurisdictions, the water of natural streams 
[was] declared by constitution or statute to be the property 
of the public and subject to appropriation.  The states 
[had] authority to establish for themselves rules within 
their borders, subject to constitutional restraint against 
interfering with vested property rights or the taking of 
private property for public use without just 
compensation.13 
 
Therefore, even though Mead’s Wyoming system attempted to establish 
strong public rights in water, most western states adopted systems favoring 
private water rights.14  In his 1912 treatise on irrigation and water rights, 
Clesson Kinney did not summarize western water law as subordinating 
private water rights to the welfare of the state.  Rather, he stated: 
                                                           
9. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 
109 (1983). 
10. WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3; Basin Elec. Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 
578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978). 
11. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 113–32. 
12. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
13. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at § 53, 348–349 (emphasis added). 
14. Id. at § 22; DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 86–132. 
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A water right, acquired under the arid region doctrine of 
appropriation, may be defined as the exclusive, 
independent property right to the use of water 
appropriated according to law from any natural stream, 
based upon possession and the right continued only so 
long as the water is actually applied to some beneficial 
use or purpose.15 
 
Even in those western states that adopted some version of Mead’s 
Wyoming system, western water law established more certain private 
rights in water than did the riparian doctrine: 
 
A water right under the doctrine of prior appropriation is 
an “exclusive right.”  Under the common law the right to 
use water from a stream is not exclusive.  The common-
law right to the use of water by one individual depends 
upon the equal or correlative rights to its use by all of the 
riparian owners.  Riparian proprietors are tenants in 
common while appropriators are tenants in severalty.16 
 
As a result of riparian proprietors being tenants in common, their water 
rights are nonexclusive with respect to the other riparians, but exclusive 
with respect to non-riparian owners and the state.  Conversely, a prior 
appropriation water right is exclusive against all including the state.  
Therefore, the prior appropriation system established a stronger property 
interest in the use of a certain quantity or flow of water than did the riparian 
system.    
 Furthermore, riparian rights are not alienable, severable, divisible, 
or assignable, apart from the land adjacent to the stream.17  Conversely, 
the western prior appropriation system for the most part recognizes that a 
water right is severable, alienable, and assignable apart from land, so long 
                                                           
15. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 347 (citing 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION 
&WATER RIGHTS, 1314–1315 (2d ed. 1912) (emphasis added)). 
16. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 347 (citations omitted). 
17. Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 379 Mich. 667, 686 (Mich. 
1967). 
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as doing so does not harm other water rights holders.18  An early water 
treatise went so far as to say: “The corpus of water, like a wild animal, 
may be severed from its natural surroundings and be reduced to 
possession, as for example, in a reservoir.”19  Part of what the western 
states sought to accomplish by rejecting the riparian system and embracing 
the appropriation system was to create secure, private rights in water that 
would provide water users with incentives to make efficient and 
productive use of a scarce water supply. 
 
II. NATURE OF PROPERTY INTERESTS IN WESTERN WATER 
 
A. A Bundle of Sticks 
 
 In real property cases, courts have often described property rights 
as a “bundle of sticks,” meaning there can be many distinct interests in a 
single parcel of land.  For example, one individual may own the right to 
use and occupy a parcel’s surface while another individual has the right to 
develop its underlying minerals, a third person has the right to travel across 
the surface pursuant to an easement, and a fourth person has a right to 
utilize the airspace above the surface.  Occasionally a landowner possesses 
“fee simple” in a particular parcel, meaning that landowner controls the 
parcel in all possible respects.  More often, however, multiple individuals 
control one or more sticks in a single bundle.  Depending on which stick 
or stocks a person owns, that person controls one or more resources of the 
property.  
 To understand the parameters of any property right, one must 
understand the types of interests that may exist in a particular resource.  In 
the case of land, a property interest can range from a mere easement to fee 
simple.  Most interests in land are less than fee simple, and all interests in 
land are subject to the right of the state to regulate pursuant to its police 
powers.  Not all potential uses, including non-use, are compatible, so one 
                                                           
18. See, e.g., Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 317 (Colo. 1891); 
Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377–78 (Colo. 1982); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 85–2–403(1) (2017) (provides that water rights are an appurtenance with the 
conveyance of land, unless previously severed or specifically exempted).  Although 
common law has upheld severability, alienability and assignability of water rights, 
there are state law limits on alienability and severability.  
19. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 346. 
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interest may eclipse another.  For example, the traditional rule is that the 
mineral estate is dominant in relation to the surface estate, meaning the 
mineral owner has the right to use the surface to the extent reasonably 
necessary to develop the mineral resources.  The value of a particular 
interest in land is therefore determined by “the amount of in rem control a 
person has,” and by the associated right to exclude others, which could be 
considered a stick in the bundle.20  
 Property interests in water rights, too, resemble a bundle of sticks. 
One person might own a right to divert water for irrigation, while another 
person has the right to float on the surface, a third has the right to fish in 
the water, a fourth has a right use the flow of the stream to power a mill, 
and a fifth has the right to dispose of waste in the water.  Some of these 
uses may be simultaneously compatible.  For example, a mill can be 
powered by water in which others have disposed of waste.  But, for the 
most part, water uses are not simultaneously compatible where uses 
involve the diversion and/or consumption of water and others require a 
minimum streamflow dependent upon the non-diversion and non-
consumption of water.  Water diverted and consumed for irrigation cannot 
be used downstream for fishing, floating, or powering a mill.  Thus, most 
rights in water have value because they are exclusive to the user and 
dominant in relation to the rights others may possess in the same water.  
This is the linchpin of the prior appropriation doctrine. 
Historically, most western water rights were consumptive use of 
water.  Some, and often much, of the water would be returned to the 
common source of supply, but while one used the water, others could not.  
In fact, most western states required the diversion of water to perfect a 
water right claim.  While the diversion rule served to give notice and proof 
of actual use, it also meant that water rights could only be had for out-of-
stream uses.  Thus, uses that did not require diversion, such as fishing 
(with some narrow exceptions), navigation, or waste disposal, were not 
recognized as a protectable property interest in the form of a water right.  
Persons making in-stream uses of water effectively functioned as tenants 
in common with everyone else using water in-stream.  Generally, under 
western appropriative water law, property rights in water were limited to 
out-of-stream, consumptive uses that were superior to all other possible 
uses while the water remained in the possession of the user.  Former 
Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. explained:  
                                                           
20. ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY, 
11–12 (1992). 
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Western prior appropriation water law is a property 
rights-based allocation and administration system which 
promotes multiple use of a finite resource.  The 
fundamental characteristics of this system guarantee 
security, assure reliability, and cultivate flexibility.  
Security resides in the system’s ability to identify and 
obtain protection for the right of use.  Reliability springs 
from the system’s assurance that the right of use will 
continue to be recognized and enforced over time.  
Flexibility emanates from the fact that other appropriators 
not be injured by the change.21 
 
 An appropriative water right is a freehold, exclusive, and 
conditional interest.22  Unlike ownership of a stick in the bundle of real 
property rights, an appropriative water right is conditional because it may 
be forfeited or abandoned by non-use.23  However, a water right’s 
susceptibility to forfeiture does not diminish its constitutional protection.  
In other words, a water right remains valid and constitutionally protected 
subject to the legal grounds for forfeiture.   
 In most states, legal grounds for forfeiture include ceasing to put 
water to a beneficial use.  Beneficial use is an evolving definition, so a use 
of water once recognized as beneficial can become non-beneficial and lose 
its constitutional property protections as a result.24  For example, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that the prior appropriation has 
“evolved” to recognize uses of water that do not require physical diversion 
of water: 
 
Although our statutory scheme regulating the 
appropriation of water has contemplated an actual 
physical diversion of water, we have never said that a 
requirement to do so existed. This is understandable if we 
                                                           
21. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical 
Overview, 1 U. DENV.WATER L. REV. 1, 2 (1997). 
22. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 346 (citations omitted). 
23. Id. 
24. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 
972, 1007, 3 Cal.2d 489, 567 (Cal. 1935). (“What is a beneficial use at one time may, 
because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time.”). 
2019     CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF WATER RIGHTS  
 
35 
give consideration to that, until passage of our instream 
flows act, it was necessary to actually divert water to put 
it to a beneficial use permitted by law in Wyoming. 
“Beneficial use” is, however, an evolving concept and can 
be expanded to reflect changes in society’s recognition of 
the value of new uses of our resources. Actual diversion 
is neither constitutionally required nor an essential 
element of our appropriation doctrine. Beneficial use is 
the key element.25 
 
“Beneficial use” could therefore evolve to leave some once-protected 
water rights unprotected.  This aspect—unique to property interests in 
water—is no doubt a function of water’s scarcity, particularly in the 
American West.  
 Therefore, based on the theory of the prior appropriation doctrine, 
the two critical parameters of sticks (in the bundle of sticks) for a water 
right are: 1) the date of first use establishing the property owner’s priority 
in relation to other rights owners on the same stream, and 2) the amount 
of water the owner is entitled to use.26  On this issue the Montana Supreme 
Court stated: “[p]roperty rights in water consist not alone in the amount of 
the appropriation, but, also, in the priority of the appropriation . . . . Hence 
to deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable 
property right.”27  
 
B. The “Usufructuary” Nature of A Water Right Does Not Diminish 
the Constitutional Protection of the Property Interest 
 
Water rights have long been described as usufructuary, meaning 
the owner possesses a right to use the water as opposed to owning the 
water itself.28  This description served to make clear that others may have 
a right to use the same water at a different time and in a different place.  It 
recognized the transient nature of water and thus distinguished it from land 
where a property owner may be said to own the dirt itself without affecting 
                                                           
25. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn 
River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992). 
26. See Gen. Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 863 (Mont. 1975). 
27. Id. 
28. Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 541 (1923). 
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the rights of other real property owners.  The common law’s recognition 
of this pragmatic difference between the use of water and use of land has 
been relied upon for claiming that water rights, because they are 
usufructuary, are a less constitutionally protected form of property right.29 
The factor that gives any property right value, making it 
something for which compensation must be paid if the right is taken, is the 
control the property owner has over the use of the particular resource.  
Land has value because of its potential uses and non-uses.  Although true 
that the right to exclude has constitutional value independent from the 
economic value of land, deriving from control over use, the economic 
value determines what compensation must be paid when land is taken.  It 
is the same with water rights.  The economic value of a water right is 
control over its use or non-use.  In this sense, which is the only sense 
relevant to the Takings Clause, the usufructuary nature of water rights 
makes them similar to, rather than different from, land.  However, the fact 
that the main stick in the water rights bundle is the right of use in no way 
lessens the constitutional protection afforded a water right.  Much takings 
jurisprudence has focused on land, but that does not mean that rights in 
physically different resources like water or intellectual property warrant 
any less constitutional protection.  The owner’s exclusive rights of use or 
non-use give those rights economic value.  
Appropriative water rights are generally understood to be 
usufructuary.  A usufructuary interest consists of the right to use, but not 
own, the water.30  In 1911, Samuel C. Wiel described the prior 
appropriation doctrine in terms of the law of capture, which had also been 
applied to wildlife and petroleum: 
 
(1) Running water in a natural stream is not the subject of 
property, but is a wandering, changing thing without an 
                                                           
29. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act Section 404 
Permitting, and the Takings Clause, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 911 (1989); Margaret 
Z. Ferguson, Instream Appropriations and the Dormant Commerce Clause: 
Conserving Water for the Future, 75 GEO. L.J. 1701, 1711 (1987).   
30. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 349 (citing Wells A. Hutchins, 
Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, Misc. Pub. No. 418 at 27 
(USDA 1942)).  See also Sherlock v. Greaves, 76 P.2d 87, 91 (Mont. 1938) (citations 
omitted) (“We are committed to the rule that the appropriator of a water right does not 
own the water, but has the ownership of its use only.”). 
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owner, like the very fish swimming in it, or like wild 
animals, the air in the atmosphere, and the negative 
community in general.  (2) With respect to this substance 
the law recognizes a right to take and use of it, and to have 
it flow to the taker so that it may be taken and used—a 
usufructuary right. (3) When taken from its natural 
stream, so much of the substance as is actually taken is 
captured, and, passing under private possession and 
control, becomes private property during the period of 
possession.31  
 
 Although advocates of the uncompensated regulation of property 
interests in water have made much of the usufructuary nature of a water 
right, it should have no significance on the constitutional protections of 
the Fifth Amendment.  Interests in water rights are described differently 
from interests in land because of the transient—and sometimes reusable—
nature of the resource.  While land is generally most effectively used by 
the actual possessor of the corpus of the resource, most water uses allow 
repeated use by successive water rights holders.  As Judge Loren A. Smith 
stated, “[t]he property involved in this case is atypical of most takings 
litigation.  It is not land or minerals at a specific time, but rather the usage 
of water which ebbs and flows throughout the year.”32 The frequent, 
accurate statement that water rights are usufructuary simply reflects the 
physical nature of the resource and the requirements of a functional system 
of property rights in that unique resource.  Usufructuary was never 
intended to express a peculiar limit on property rights in water or justify 
unusually broad exercise of the police power.  Property rights in water 
                                                           
31. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 349 (citing 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN 
THE WESTERN STATES §§ 709, 739, 773–75, 792–95 (3d ed. 1911)). 
32. Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 573 (2002). 
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have no lesser constitutional standing than property rights in land,33 in 
easements,34 in intellectual property, or in mineral estates.35 
 Even though a property interest in water has different 
characteristics than a property interest in land, it is generally considered to 
be real property.36  As Wiel stated nearly a century ago, “the right to the 
flow and use of water being a right in a natural resource, is real estate.”37  
A water right is considered real property in a quiet-title action, in a 
mortgage recording instrument, when satisfying a statute of frauds, for 
purposes of descent and inheritance, and for taxation.38  
For example, the Montana Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the 
[water] right is fully perfected, that is, when there was a diversion of the 
water and its application to a beneficial use, it thereupon became a 
property right of which the owner could only be divested in some legal 
manner.”39  Exactly thirty years later that same court stated: 
 
The following concepts require no citation of authority: 
One who has appropriated water in Montana acquires a 
distinct property right; this water right is a species of 
property in and of itself and may exist separate and 
independent of a ditch right; each is capable of several and 
                                                           
33. See, e.g., Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo. 
1982); Gen. Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 863–64 (Mont. 1975; Harrer v. N. 
Pac. Ry. Co., 410 P.2d 713, 715 (1966) (stating that water rights are “considered 
property of the highest order”); Sheep Mountain Cattle Co. v. State Dep’t of Ecology, 
726 P.2d 55, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that “[p]roperty owners have a vested 
interest in their water rights); Strait v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 322 (1881) (stating that 
[t]here[’s] . . . no difficulty in recognizing a right to the use of water flowing in a 
stream as private property). 
34. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, 266–67 (1946). 
35. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 
(1922) (holding that coal interests were compensable property interest); Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 45–46 (1960); Whitney Benefits v. United States, 18 Cl. 
Ct. 394, 409 (1989). 
36. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 345.  See also Carson City v. Estate of 
Lompa, 501 P.2d 662 (Nev. 1972). 
37. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 345 n.4. 
38. Id. at 345 n.5. 
39. Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 62 P.2d 206, 210 (Mont. 1936); see 
also Smith v. Denniff, 60 P. 398, 400 (1900) (stating that a water right is “a positive, 
certain, and vested property right” of which the appropriator could not be divested). 
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distinct injuries; both water rights and ditch rights are 
considered property of the highest order.40 
 
Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals stated, “[p]roperty owners 
have a vested interest in their water rights, and these rights are entitled to 
due process protection.”41  The Nevada Supreme Court reached the same 
conclusion, holding: “[t]here is . . . no difficulty in recognizing a right to 
the use of water flowing in a stream as private property.”42 
 
III. TAKINGS LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO WATER 
RIGHTS 
  
The Fifth Amendment only requires that property owners be 
compensated for the value of property rights taken.43  The meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment language, “nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation,” would be the same if it were written as 
an affirmative authorization to take private property for a public use, upon 
payment of just compensation.  As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States: 
 
[w]hat is not at issue is whether the Government can 
lawfully prevent a property owner from filling or 
otherwise injuring or destroying vital wetlands . . . . The 
question at issue here is, when the Government fulfills its 
obligation to preserve and protect the public interest, may 
the cost of obtaining that public benefit fall solely upon 
the affected property owner, or is it to be shared by the 
community at large.44   
 
The police power of the state is in no way diminished by the 
enforcement of the Takings Clause’s mandate for just compensation. 
                                                           
40. Harrer v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 410 P.2d 713, 715 (Mont. 1966).  
41. Sheep Mountain Cattle Co. v. State Dep’t of Ecology, 726 P.2d 55, 
57 (Wash. App. 1986). 
42. Strait v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 322 (Nev. 1881). 
43. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
44. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
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 The Supreme Court decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard makes 
clear that the purpose of the Takings Clause has nothing to do with the 
extent of the police power and everything to do with the state’s ability to 
redistribute wealth held in the form of property.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority stated: “One of the principal purposes of the 
Takings Clause is to ‘bar government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.’”45 
A seminal Supreme Court case dealing with takings, Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., established a clearer approach to takings 
jurisprudence by building on the fairness concept and deleting due process 
analysis from the Fifth Amendment takings analysis.46 In her opinion for 
the Lingle majority, Justice O’Connor stated: “While scholars have offered 
various justifications for this regime, we have emphasized its role in 
‘bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole.’”47  In that case, the Court explained that the most important 
takings inquiry was the impact of the government’s action on the property 
owner: 
 
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be 
characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in 
Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common 
touchstone.  Each aims to identify regulatory actions that 
are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or 
ousts the owners from his domain.  Accordingly, each of 
these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden 
that government imposes upon private property rights.  
The Court has held that physical takings require 
compensation because of the burden they impose: A 
permanent physical invasion, however minimal the 
economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s rights to 
exclude others from entering and using her property–
perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.  In 
                                                           
45. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (citing Armstrong 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
46. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–42, 545 (2005). 
47. Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49). 
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the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of 
a property’s value is the determinative factor.  And the 
Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not 
exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s 
economic impact and the degree to which it interferes 
with legitimate property interests.48 
 
Similar to Lingle, the Court of Federal Claims in Tulare49  started 
its analysis with the same often-quoted sentence from Armstrong v. United 
States discussing fairness.50 After disposing of some contract legal 
theories, the Court of Federal Claims determined the nature of the alleged 
taking: 
 
Courts have traditionally divided their analysis of Fifth 
Amendment takings into two categories:  physical takings 
and regulatory takings.  A physical taking occurs when 
the government’s action amounts to a physical occupation 
or invasion of property, including the functional 
equivalent of a “practical ouster of [the owner’s] 
possession.”  Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 
642, 25 L.Ed. 336 (1878); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 
73 L.Ed. 2d 868 (1982).  When an owner has suffered a 
physical invasion of his property, courts have noted that 
“no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how 
weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required 
compensation.” 
 
A regulatory taking, in contrast, arises when the 
government’s regulation restricts the use to which an 
owner may put his property. In assessing whether a 
regulatory taking has occurred, courts generally employ 
the balancing test set forth in Penn Central, weighing the 
character of the government action, the economic impact 
of that action and the reasonableness of the property 
                                                           
48. Id. at 539 (citations omitted).  
49. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.Cl. 
313, 316 (2001). 
50. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
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owner’s investment-backed expectations. Regulations 
that are found to be too restrictive, however—i.e., those 
that deprive property of its entire economically beneficial 
or productive use—are commonly identified as 
categorical takings and, like physical takings, require no 
such balancing.51 
 
In Tulare, the Court of Federal Claims faced the intersection of “the 
Endangered Species Act and California’s century-old regime of private 
water rights . . . and the proper balance between them . . . .”52  That court’s 
use of the word “balance” seemed to foreshadow that a regulatory takings 
analysis would be applied to the plaintiff’s claim for loss of water rights 
due to ESA-imposed restrictions. However, the court viewed the taking of 
water rights as a physical taking, reasoning: 
 
In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—
the hallmark of a regulatory action—completely 
eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole 
entitlement is to the use of water. Unlike other species of 
property where use restrictions may limit some, but not 
all of the incidents of ownership, the denial of a right to 
the use of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all 
value. . . . That complete occupation of property—an 
exclusive possession of plaintiffs’ water-use rights for 
preservation of fish—mirrors the [physical] invasion 
present in Causby. To that extent, then, that the federal 
government, by preventing plaintiffs from using the water 
to which they would otherwise have been entitled, have 
rendered the usufructuary right to that water valueless, 
they have thus effected a physical taking.53 
 
United States v. Causby, is the physical takings case involving real 
property referenced by the Tulare Court.54  In Causby, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a 
                                                           
51. Id. at 318. 
52. Id. at 314. 
53. Id. at 319. 
54. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
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landowner’s property constituted a taking because: “If, by reason of the 
frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land 
for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as if the United 
States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive 
possession of it.”55  The fact that an appropriative water right is 
usufructuary therefore supports, rather than undercuts, the conclusion that 
any government action that limits a water right holder from using the water 
constitutes a per se, physical taking. A mere restriction on use—the 
hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right itself 
because a water right holder’s sole entitlement is to the use of water. 
After Lingle and Lucas, the trend in takings cases indicates that 
courts will require just compensation when the state chooses to reallocate 
resources at the expense of private landowners.  As the Tulare Court held, 
this same approach to interpretation of the Takings Clause does apply 
equally to private rights in water. 
 Although this trend evidences something of a changing approach 
to takings claims Fifth Amendment jurisprudence continues to reflect a 
structured analysis which should be expected to apply in takings claims 
involving water rights.  That analysis poses the following questions in 
order:   
 
A. Is there a constitutionally-protected property right?   
B. Is the government action a categorical taking? 
C. Has there been a partial taking?  
D. On balance, do the public benefits of the regulation 
justify the burden on private property? 
E. If there is a taking, what is the value of just 
compensation for the taking?  
 
If regulations depriving use of water rights were consistently viewed by 
courts as per se, physical takings as in Tulare—an approach advocated 
by the authors—the analysis would be much simpler. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
55. Id. at 261. 
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A. Is There A Constitutionally-Protected Property Right? 
 
More than three decades ago, the Supreme Court stated that, 
“[p]roperty interests . . .  are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.”56  The Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated, “[t]he Constitution neither creates nor defines the scope of 
property interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment,” which 
interests instead are defined by “‘existing rules or understandings’ and 
‘background principles’ derived from an independent source, such as state, 
federal or common law.”57  In Lucas, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
state law determines the “bundle of sticks” that inhere in a property 
owner’s title.58  Therefore, “[f]irst, a court determines whether the plaintiff 
possesses a valid interest in the property affected by the government 
action.”59 
As water rights are recognized as property rights under state law,60 
they are entitled to the same constitutional protection as any form of 
property.61  Furthermore, courts have long recognized that water rights are 
                                                           
56. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 
(1980) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).  Even though 
states can define the extent and nature of property rights, this does not mean a state 
can willy nilly change property rights.  In fact, the federal Takings Clause prohibits 
government, including state government, from taking property even by redefinition, 
without compensation, unless this was an acknowledged condition of the property 
right. 
57. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)). 
58. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n. 7 (1992). 
59. Karuk Tribe v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Skip 
Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 870 (1995) (citing United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 
U.S. 266, 281 (1943).  See also Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 
504 (2005) (the court determined that pursuant to Oregon state law, plaintiffs did not 
have a state-defined property interest in their use Bureau of Reclamation delivered 
water). 
60. Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222, 230–32 (2005). 
61. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 
313, 319 (2001). 
 
2019     CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF WATER RIGHTS  
 
45 
controlled by state law because Congress has repeatedly enacted laws 
specifying that state law governs private water rights.62 
Normally, the parameters of real property rights include the right 
to exclude others,63 the right of possession,64 and the right to alienate.65  
Because of the peculiar nature of the water resource, water rights are 
deemed usufructuary rights and are defined by elements such as source, 
flow rate and/or volume, priority date, and purpose.66  Former Colorado 
Supreme Court Justice Hobbs described a Colorado water right as: 
 
[A] right to use beneficially a specified amount of water, 
from the available supply of surface water or tributary 
groundwater, that can be captured, possessed, and 
controlled in priority under a decree, to the exclusion of 
all others not then in priority under a decreed water right.  
A water right comes into existence only through 
application of the water to the appropriator’s beneficial 
use; that beneficial use then becomes the basis, measure, 
and limit of the appropriation.67 
                                                           
62. See, e.g., Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 612–
13 (1978) (discussing Congress’ early regulation of federal land); California v. United 
States, 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978) (stating Congress intended to recognize as valid the 
customary law with respect to the use of water which had grown up among the 
occupants of public land under the peculiar necessities of their condition); Act of July 
9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218, 41 Cong. Ch. 236 (Congress ensured occupants of federal public 
land would be bound by state water law, by providing that “all patents granted, or 
preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water 
rights”); Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935) 
(stating that the 1877 Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, “effected a severance of 
all water upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself”). 
63. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–180 (1979) (“The 
right to exclude, so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, 
falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without 
compensation.”). 
64. Cox Cable San Diego v. County of San Diego, 185 Cal. App. 3d 368, 
376 (1986) (“[R]eal property includes the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or 
right to the possession of land….”). 
65. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2000). 
66. Mont. Code Ann. § 85–2–234(6) (2017). 
67. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 
53 (Colo. 1999) (citations omitted). 
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 Due to the prior appropriation doctrine, two primary elements of 
a water right are: (1) the amount of water that has been put to beneficial 
use and (2) the priority of water rights relative to each other.68 Changing 
what constitutes beneficial use or shuffling priority dates can therefore 
diminish the value of, or “take,” that right.69  The prior appropriation 
doctrine greatly values use of water rights, so much so that non-use or non-
beneficial use can result in forfeiture.70 
Beneficial use can also serve as the measure of protection afforded 
or not afforded to an appropriative water right. As the Federal Circuit has 
described California water rights: 
 
Although appropriative water rights are viewed as 
property under California law, those rights are limited to 
the “beneficial use” of the water involved. This principle, 
set forth explicitly in the California Constitution, limits 
water rights holders to the use of the amount of water 
“reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served     
. . . .” The same limitation is found in the California Water 
Code. California courts have found the beneficial use 
limitation a valid exercise of state power to regulate water 
rights for public benefit and have deemed it an 
“overriding constitutional limitation” on those rights.71 
 
Similar to this California case, Montana’s Supreme Court allowed the 
state’s Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (“DNRC”) to 
modify the beneficial use of water during an administrative process to 
change a water right.72 The DNRC decreased the volume of the water right 
based on the department’s calculation of consumptive use, which therefore 
allowed the DNRC to modify the beneficial use element of a water right.73 
This is arguably an unconstitutional taking of a water right.   
                                                           
68. State Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993). 
69. General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 166 Mont. 510, 516–
17 (Mont. 1975) (“Priority in appropriation of water is a valuable right. . . . [T]o 
deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable property right.”). 
70. Mont. Code Ann. § 85–2–227(3) (2017).   
71. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
72. Hohenlohe v. State, 240 P.3d 628, 357 Mont. 438 (Mont. 2010). 
73. Id. at ¶ 70. 
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 Overall, water rights in western states are protected so long as they 
are put to beneficial use by the rights holder, although like real property, 
they remain subject to the government’s power to take that right pursuant 
to due process and in conformance with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause. The value of a water right rests entirely on the right to use water.  
Thus, any government action that precludes use of the water right deprives 
the owner of some—or arguably all as recognized in Tulare––of the 
economic value of the water right, meaning just compensation must be 
paid to the owner. 
 
B. IS THE GOVERNMENT ACTION A CATEGORICAL TAKING? 
 
In Lucas, the Court acknowledged that although it had not 
followed any “set formula” in its takings analysis, the case law had 
established “two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable 
without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support 
of the restraint.”74  The two categorical, or per se, takings situations are 
physical invasion of property and regulation that denies all economically 
beneficial use of the property.75 
 
1. Is There A Physical Invasion of the “Usufructuary Right”? 
 
A physical invasion occurs when property is physically occupied 
as a consequence of state action or regulation.76  The most obvious case of 
physical invasion occurs when government seeks to locate public facilities 
like roads and buildings on private property.  As the Court stated in Dolan, 
“In general . . . no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how 
weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation [for 
physical invasions].”77 Recently, the imposition of exactions has tempered 
this requirement. For example, in Dolan, the Supreme Court recognized 
that conditions imposed by a city on its approval of a building permit, 
including “[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are 
                                                           
74. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
75. Id. 
76. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982). 
77. Id. 
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generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a 
proposed property use.”78 
The theory of this per se takings category was explained in Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,79 a case involving a 
relatively minor––1.5 square foot––state-mandated, physical invasion of 
private property: 
 
To the extent that the government permanently occupies 
physical property, it effectively destroys each of these 
rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the 
occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude 
the occupier from possession and use of the space.  The 
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of 
the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of 
property rights.80 
 
 The Court went on to say that regulations which result in a 
“permanent physical occupation” or in a “temporary physical invasion” of 
property are essentially the same as a governmental condemnation 
requiring just compensation.81  Although the Court has declined to expand 
the physical invasion category to include regulations which force a 
property owner to accept less than market value from a tenant,82 federal 
courts have consistently held that governmental orders that deprive 
landowners of the right to exclude others from their property are per se 
takings.83 
 Courts traditionally begin a physical takings inquiry by first 
determining whether the government action appropriated the private 
property.  For example, one court stated, “the essential inquiry is whether 
the injury to the claimant’s property is in the nature of a tortious invasion 
                                                           
78. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994). 
79. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982). 
80. Id. at 435. 
81. Id. at 436 n. 12. 
82. E.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). 
83.  See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 
(1987); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that an 
EPA order that authorized access to private property to install and maintain a 
monitoring well was a per se taking). 
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of his rights or rises to the magnitude of an appropriation of some interest 
in his property permanently to the use of the [g]overnment.”84  This 
“appropriation” inquiry readily applies to appropriative water rights given 
that “it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage which 
results from it’ that determines whether a taking occurred.”85 
 Because water is transient and not possessed in the same way as 
land, it may appear at first glance that water rights are not subject to 
physical invasion.  As the court recognized in Hage, “[t]he property 
involved in this case is atypical of most takings litigation.  It is not land or 
minerals at a specific time, but rather the usage of water which ebbs and 
flows throughout the year.”86 
 However, an important trilogy of United States Supreme Court 
cases, beginning with International Paper Co. v. United States, 
established that regulation restricting the use of water is a physical 
invasion amounting to a taking of private water rights by the government.87   
During World War I, the United States issued a requisition order for all 
hydroelectric power from the Niagara Falls Power Company.88  The power 
company leased a portion of its water to plaintiff International Paper 
Company, which diverted the water via a canal to its mill.89  In response 
to the United States’ order to “cut off the water being taken” by 
International Paper to increase hydroelectric power production, Niagara 
Power ceased diverting water to International Paper.90  International Paper 
was unable to operate its mill for nearly ten months as a result.91  Although 
the government did not physically take over the operations of either 
Niagara Power or International Paper, nor did it physically direct the flow 
                                                           
84. National By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273–74 
(1969).  
85. Baird v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 324, 329 (1984) (quoting United 
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327).  
(1917)). 
86. Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 573 (Fed. Cl. 2002).  
87. 282 U.S. 399 (1931). 
88. Id. at 405. 
89. Id. at 404–05. 
90. Id. at 405–06. 
91. Id. at 406. 
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of water, the Supreme Court still found that the government directly 
appropriated water that International Paper had a right to use.92 
 In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., Gerlach possessed 
riparian water rights for irrigation of its grasslands by natural seasonal 
overflow of the San Joaquin River in California.93  After the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation built Friant Dam upstream of Gerlach’s land, “a 
dry river bed” was left downstream of the dam, and the overflow irrigation 
of Gerlach’s lands virtually ceased.94  The United States had caused water 
to be physically diverted away from Gerlach for storage and delivery to 
third parties who held water contracts.95  While the Friant Dam served a 
public purpose of “mak[ing] water available where it would be of the 
greatest service,” the Supreme Court concluded the government’s action 
was a physical taking.96 
 In Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the 
distinction between regulatory and physical takings analysis with respect 
to water rights. 97  Dugan also involved claims arising out of the United 
States’ physical diversion of water for use by third parties through 
construction of the Friant Dam.  Landowners along the San Joaquin River 
who owned riparian and other rights in the river alleged that the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s upstream storage of water behind Friant Dam left 
insufficient water to supply their water rights.98  The Supreme Court again 
characterized the government’s action as a physical taking.99 
 In Tulare, the Court relied on this trilogy of cases to hold that 
plaintiff’s assertion of a physical taking was the correct analysis because, 
“the distinction between a physical invasion and a governmental activity 
that merely impairs the use of that property turns on whether the intrusion 
is ‘so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment 
                                                           
92. Id. at 407 (“The petitioner’s right was to the use of the water; and 
when all the water that it used was withdrawn from the petitioner’s mill and turned 
elsewhere by government requisition for the production of power it is hard to see what 
more the Government could do to take the use.”). 
93. 339 U.S. 725, 729–30 (1950). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 728. 
97. 372 U.S. 609, 614 (1963). 
98. Id. at 616. 
99. Id. at 625–26. 
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of the property and to limit his exploitation of it.’”100  Tulare analogized a 
government restriction on the use of water rights to a physical taking of 
land, reasoning that the water rights had been rendered useless in the same 
manner that land had been rendered useless by the frequency and altitude 
of overhead flights in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 
(1946).101   
 Tulare and the trilogy of Supreme Court cases would go on to 
inform the 2008 Casitas decision.  Casitas recognized that a physical 
taking is the paradigmatic form of a taking and occurs by direct 
government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.102  
Casitas also recognized that two categories of regulatory action can be 
deemed per se takings in the same manner that physical takings are viewed 
as per se takings.103  These categories are: (1) when the government 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical property invasion, 
however minor––as in Loretto––and (2) when regulation completely 
deprives an owner of all economically beneficial property use, as in Lucas.  
Regulatory takings outside of those narrow categories are governed by 
Penn Central analysis.104  The Casitas Court turned to the trilogy of 
Supreme Court cases for guidance, noting that in all three, “the United 
States physically diverted the water, or caused water to be diverted away 
from the plaintiffs’ property.”105 
 Casitas found that the governmental regulation at issue resulted in 
a physical diversion of water away from the plaintiff: “[T]he government 
did not merely require some water to remain in stream, but instead actively 
caused the physical diversion of water away from the [plaintiff’s canal] . . 
. .”106  Although not all of the plaintiff’s water was taken, in the context of 
physical takings jurisprudence, any impairment, however minor, is a 
taking.107  The fact that the government took Casitas’ water for a public 
purpose––the preservation of endangered fish under the Endangered 
                                                           
100.  Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 
313, 319 (2001) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946)). 
101. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319. 
102. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
103. Id. at 1288–89. 
104. Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
105. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1289–90. 
106. Id. at 1291. 
107. Id. at 1290 (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963)). 
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Species Act––did not diminish the nature of the physical taking.  “When 
the government forces Casitas to divert water away from the Robles-
Casitas Canal to the fish ladder for the public purpose of protecting West 
Coast Steelhead Trout, this is a governmental use of the water.”108  Any 
diversion of a private, usufructuary water right for a public purpose is a 
per se taking.109  “The active hand of the government,” in diverting water 
away from Casitas, “permanently” took that water from Casitas.110  The 
taking of water “is not temporary, and it does not leave the right in the 
same state it was before the government action.  The water, and Casitas’ 
right to use that water, is forever gone.”111 
 Recently, in Klamath, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the 
issue of whether a taking of water rights should be analyzed as regulatory 
or physical taking.112  The plaintiffs are water users in the Klamath River 
Basin, which receives water from the Klamath Irrigation Project.113  The 
United States Bureau of Reclamation operates the Klamath Irrigation 
Project.114  The irrigation project’s “dual purposes of serving agricultural 
uses and providing for the needs of wildlife” are “subject to the 
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.”115  In order to comply with 
the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, the Bureau of 
Reclamation withheld delivery of irrigation water for several months.116  
When water was finally released, it was alleged to have been too late in 
the growing season to grow crops. 
The Klamath court began its inquiry into whether the plaintiffs 
had suffered a physical or regulatory taking of their water rights by noting:  
 
Decisions of the Supreme Court have drawn a clear line 
between physical and regulatory takings. The former 
involves a physical occupation or destruction of property, 
while the latter involve restrictions on the use of the 
                                                           
108. Id. at 1292–93. 
109. Id. at 1292. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1296. 
112. Klamath Irrigation v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722 (2016). 
113. Id. at 724. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 725–26. 
116. Id. at 726. 
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property. The distinction is important because physical 
takings constitute per se takings and impose a categorical 
duty on the government to compensate the owner, 
whereas regulatory takings generally require balancing 
and complex factual assessments, using the so-called 
Penn Central test. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has held that our focus should 
primarily be on the character of the government action 
when determining whether a physical or regulatory taking 
has occurred.117 
 
The court then noted the facts it was presented with were “very similar to 
those in Casitas.”118  It cited Casitas for its determination that “the 
appropriate reference point in time to determine whether the United States 
caused a physical diversion is the status quo before the challenged 
government action.”119  For users of irrigation water in the Klamath Basin, 
the status quo prior to the government’s action was “generally receiv[ing] 
as much water for irrigation as they needed.”120  By refusing to release 
water, “the government prevented water that would have, under the status 
quo ante, flowed into the Klamath Project and to the plaintiffs.”121  
Governmental action “arrested and diverted waters destined for the 
plaintiffs in the same manner the Supreme Court found to have caused a 
physical taking in Gerlach and Dugan.”122  The Bureau of Reclamation’s 
retention of water “amount[s] to a physical diversion of water.”123  The 
Klamath court then found that a regulatory taking analysis was not 
appropriate because governmental action, not regulation, deprived the 
plaintiffs of their water.124  Accordingly, the government’s actions should 
have been analyzed as a per se, physical taking.125 
 
                                                           
117. Id. at 730. 
118. Id. at 733. 
119. Id. at 734. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124.  Id. at 734–35. 
125.  Id. at 737. 
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C. Has There Been A Partial Taking? 
 
Current Supreme Court takings doctrine draws a distinction 
between partial and total takings.  In Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court found no taking where a state 
regulation required owners of coal to leave 50 percent of the minable coal 
in place.126  In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the majority’s 
broad definition of the relevant mass of property to consider when 
analyzing a taking: 
 
I see no reason for refusing to evaluate the impact of the 
Subsidence Act on the support estate alone, for 
Pennsylvania has clearly defined it as a separate estate in 
property. . . . I do not understand the Court to mean that 
one holding the support estate alone would find it 
worthless, for surely the owners of the mineral estate or 
surface estates would be willing buyers of this interest. . . 
. In these circumstances, where the estate defined by state 
law is both severable and of value in its own right, it is 
appropriate to consider the effect of the regulation on that 
particular property interest.127  
 
 Three forms of partial takings exist.  One is where a stick in the 
bundle of rights is taken, but the other sticks remain.  The result is a 
reduction in, but not elimination of, economic value.  A second occurs 
where all sticks in the bundle are retained, but with restrictions on the use 
of one or more sticks.  The third form of partial taking occurs where a 
regulation is applied to only a portion of the physical extent of the 
property.  Under current takings jurisprudence, the first form is a taking of 
the whole of a severable stick and is indefensible as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued.  The second form is what Penn Central’s balancing test 
applies to and is therefore only defensible if Penn Central remains 
defensible.  The third form, however, is wholly indefensible in light of a 
physical occupation analysis. 
                                                           
126.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987). The uncertainties of current takings law are well illustrated by the comparison 
of this case to the Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon case in which, on very similar facts, 
the Court found a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
127. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S., at 519. 
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 This distinction in jurisprudence between partial and total takings 
is indefensible except as a justification for engaging in the uncompensated 
regulation of private property.  The courts would not excuse a burglar who 
takes only part of his victim’s wealth, nor would the courts forgive a state 
if it took even a small percentage from random citizens’ bank accounts.  
From the point of view of the burglary victim or a person whose property 
is subject to regulation, there is no principled distinction between a partial 
and a total taking.   
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s focus on the severable sticks of the 
property rights bundle is persuasive in demonstrating that taking one stick 
from the bundle can amount to a total taking.  There is no logical reason 
to distinguish the partial and total takings of a single stick in the bundle, 
especially in the bundle of property interests in water rights where only a 
single stick––the right of use––provides the true measure of economic 
value.  In terms of economic impact, the difference is one of degree, but 
the Fifth Amendment does not permit for distinctions of degree in the 
redistribution of wealth.128 
Since Lucas, these issues have received close attention in the 
Federal Circuit.  In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,129 the 
appeals court held that a takings analysis is not an “all or nothing 
proposition.”130  Although the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to 
the Court of Federal Claims, which had found for the property owner, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the trial court “was correct in theory” in 
finding a regulatory taking when less than seven percent of a parcel was 
immediately affected by a regulation that did not deny the total value of 
even that small portion.131  
                                                           
128. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 124, 115 
(1978) (Supreme Court decisions have not been without suggestions that the wealth 
of affected property owners is relevant to whether or not a taking has occurred. The 
Penn Central majority thought it relevant that Penn Central owned other properties 
in Manhattan.); See also DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 478–79 (it was considered relevant 
that Keystone owned other properties in western Pennsylvania); C.f. Michael C. 
Blumm, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles As Categorical 
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005) (provides an extreme view 
that endorses the concepts expressed in Penn Central and DeBenedictis). 
129. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
130. Id. at 1572. 
131. Id. at 1567. 
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 Florida Rock owned 1,560 acres for which they had applied for a 
permit to dredge and fill wetlands under section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act.  The United States Army Corps of Engineers would only consider an 
application for 98 acres (the amount Florida Rock could mine in three 
years), so Florida Rock applied for a permit for 98 acres.  That application 
was denied by the Corps based on its conclusion that the proposed mining 
would cause irremediable loss of an ecologically valuable wetland parcel 
and would create undesirable water turbidity.132 The trial court concluded 
that the 98 acres were worth $10,500 per acre before the regulation and 
$500 per acre after imposition of the regulation, a diminution in value of 
about 95 percent.  The Federal Circuit questioned the method of 
assessment, and therefore the $500 per acre figure, but not the principle 
that less than total loss of value might be a taking.133 “Nothing in the 
language of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to find a taking only 
when the Government divests the total ownership of the property;” wrote 
Judge Plager for the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, “the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of private property 
without reference to the owner’s remaining property interests.”134 
In a subsequent opinion,  Judge Plager addressed in Loveladies 
Harbor v. United States what he labels “the denominator problem.135  The 
denominator problem is what happens when the determination of whether 
a categorical taking depends on how much of the property owner’s 
property is impacted by the regulation.136 The claimants had been denied 
a Section 404 permit to fill 12.5 acres of wetlands on a 51-acre parcel 
which had been part of a larger 250-acre parcel.137  The claimants had 
already developed and sold most of the 199 acres not included in the 
remaining 51 acres and  agreed to dedicate 38.5 acres to the State of New 
Jersey in return for a state permit to develop the remaining 12.5 acres.138  
These facts presented the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with 
                                                           
132.  Id. at 1563. 
133. Id. at 1567. 
134. Id. at 1569. 
135. 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (1994). 
136. Id. For example, if one owner owns all 10 acres that are being 
impacted by a regulation and the adjoining, second land owner owns a total of 50 
acres, but only 5 acres are being impacted, which would mean that the second 
landowner still had residual value in his property and therefore did not experience a 
categorical taking. 
137. Id. at 1173–74. 
138. Id. at 1174. 
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several possible denominators in a fraction expressing the diminution in 
value resulting from the challenged regulatory action.  Judge Plager opted 
for a denominator of 12.5 acres because the claimant no longer owned the 
already developed lands and had agreed to dedicate the remaining 38.5 
acres to the State.  The Court stated:  
 
Logically, the amount of just compensation should be 
proportional to the value of the interest taken as compared 
to the total value of the property, up to and including total 
deprivation, whether the taking is by physical occupation 
for the public to use as a park, or by regulatory imposition 
to preserve the property as a wetland so that it may be 
used by the public for ground water recharge and other 
ecological purposes.”139 
 
The Florida Rock majority at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that logic does not permit a distinction between partial takings 
where there is physical occupation of property and partial takings where 
there is ‘mere’ regulation.140  The majority thus rejected the possibility of 
simply precluding regulatory takings from the reach of the Fifth 
Amendment, and was left with the problem of distinguishing between “a 
partial regulatory taking and the mere ‘diminution in value’ that often 
accompanies otherwise valid regulatory impositions.”141  Justice Holmes 
saw the same dilemma in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where he 
stated, because “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law,”142 the judiciary’s task is to determine when 
government regulation goes “too far.”143  This formulation, according to 
the Florida Rock majority, “requires case by case adjudication,” an 
approach which they believe their opinion follows.144  The Court stated, 
“[p]roperty owners and regulators, attempting to predict whether a 
                                                           
139. 18 F.3d at 1569. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
143. Id. at 415. 
144. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
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governmental regulation has gone too far, will still need to use judgment 
and exercise care in making decisions.”145 
 Although the Florida Rock opinion does not provide “a bright line, 
simply drawn,”146  it eliminates some of the “ad hocery” problem.  Taken 
by itself, the “too far” language from Pennsylvania Coal is not helpful in 
drawing the distinction between regulatory taking and incidental 
diminution in value.147  But the Florida Rock majority applied Holmes’ 
concept of “reciprocity of advantage” from Penn Central to draw what is 
in fact a fairly clear line: “When there is reciprocity of advantage, . . . then 
the claim that the Government has taken private property has little force:  
the claimant has in a sense been compensated by the public program 
‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.’”148  If there are “direct compensating benefits accruing to 
the property, and others similarly situated, flowing from the regulatory 
environment,”149 the regulation will satisfy the Fifth Amendment.  But if 
regulatory benefits are “shared through the community and the society, 
while the costs are focused on a few,” the Fifth Amendment requires 
compensation.150  This is true where the affected property is less than the 
“owner’s entire fee estate” and “whether the taking results from a physical 
or regulatory action.”151 
 
                                                           
145. Id. at 1571. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1568. (“Since the Supreme Court’s decision in [Pennsylvania 
Coal], the problem for courts has been to determine the extent to which the Fifth 
Amendment burdens the exercise of the police power through regulation, that is, to 
determine when a particular regulation somehow—in the words of Justice Holmes—
goes “too far,” and therefore effects a taking.”). 
148. Id. at 1570. As Richard Epstein has pointed out, the better analysis 
is that there has been a taking, but there is no Fifth Amendment violation because it 
has been implicitly compensated in the form of reciprocal benefits to all affected 
property owners. 
149. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 1572 (“There has never been any question but that the 
Government can take any kind of recognized estate or interest in property it chooses 
in an eminent domain proceeding; it is not limited to fee interests. We see no reason 
or support for a different rule in inverse condemnation cases, and that is true whether 
the taking results from a physical or regulatory action.”). 
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D. On Balance, Do the Public Benefits of the Regulation Justify the 
Burden On Private Property? 
 
After first determining whether the government regulation takes a 
property right defined by state law, and second, whether there is a per se 
or physical taking, or whether there is a partial taking, Supreme Court 
takings doctrine, like much of current constitutional law, ultimately 
requires a balancing of interests.  In takings cases, the courts must balance 
the property owner’s loss against the public benefits.  This balancing test 
grows directly out of the legacy of Penn Central, but it is the inevitable 
consequence of the “too far” test from Pennsylvania Coal.152 
 In Penn Central, the Court held that three criteria are relevant to 
whether or not a regulation results in a taking:  (1) the character of the 
governmental action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
property owner, and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with 
distinct investment-backed expectations.153  Because balancing tests are 
by their nature ad hoc, it is impossible to generalize about the likely 
outcome in water rights taking cases.  However, the economic impacts of 
loss of water can be substantial and water users often invest heavily in 
water rights, so there is no reason to expect that property rights in water 
would be treated any differently than other property interests.  In fact, in 
Tulare, the court awarded $13,915,364.78 plus interest as compensation 
for the taking of water rights.154 
 Although Penn Central’s balancing test has not been abandoned 
by the Supreme Court, the Court’s recent takings decisions have avoided 
the judicial policy-making inherent in balancing tests.  The combination 
of the Lucas expansion of categorical takings to include total loss of 
economic value and the apparent recognition of compensable partial 
takings has made it easier to find for the property owner without engaging 
in a balancing of the private burden imposed and the public benefit gained.  
While a court could find that property owners have “shown that their 
private interest in developing and utilizing their property outweighs the 
                                                           
152. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom 
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 829 
(2006). 
153. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
154. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 
246, 266 (Fed. Cl. 2003). 
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public value in . . . [the regulation],”155 courts instead frequently defer to 
legislative judgment about the net public benefits of a regulation of 
property.156 
Absent an express abandonment of the Penn Central balancing 
test, water rights are subject to the same uncertainties which affect all 
property rights.  However, in Loveladies Harbor, the Federal Circuit 
opined that the Supreme Court had abandoned the Penn Central balancing 
test in its Lucas opinion.157  The Loveladies Harbor court stated, “[t]he 
question was not one of balance between competing public and private 
claims.  Rather the question is simply one of basic property ownership 
rights: within the bundle of rights which property lawyers understand to 
constitute property, is the right or interest at issue, as a matter of law, 
owned by the property owner or reserved to the state?”158  In its earlier 
opinion in Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit had acknowledged the 
continued viability of the Penn Central balancing test, but had identified 
a fundamental flaw in the balancing approach when it observed that 
reference to “the purpose and function of the regulatory imposition . . . [in 
distinguishing] between mere diminution and partial taking should not be 
read to suggest that when Government acts in pursuit of an important 
public purpose, its actions are excused from liability.”159  There is no 
reason to conclude that where a balancing test is applied, property interests 
in water should carry less weight than other property interests.  
 The illogic of the Penn Central balancing test is illustrated by the 
contrasting values at stake in Loretto and Penn Central.  Examples of the 
difference in values include the unconstitutional invasion in the Loretto 
case where economic loss for the property owner was minimal––far less 
than the costs resulting from the prohibition in Penn Central on the use of 
the valuable air space above Grand Central Terminal.160  Yet the property 
                                                           
155. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 399 (Cl. Ct. 
1988).  
156. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(determining that taking property for commercial development was a net public 
benefit). 
157. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1178–79. 
158. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1179. 
159. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
160. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982) (holding that a regulation requiring an apartment building owner to allow 
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owner prevailed in Loretto and was denied compensation in Penn Central.  
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld a New York City 
landmark ordinance in the face of a Fifth Amendment challenge, even 
though the ordinance dramatically reduced the value of Penn Central’s 
property.161  The issue in Penn Central was whether the regulation’s 
impact on the property owner, which fell well short of denying all 
economically beneficial use of the property, went “far enough” to 
constitute a compensable taking.162 
 In Penn Central the Court acknowledged that––”The question of 
what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has 
proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty”163––and admitted that 
it had been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when a 
regulation goes so far as to require compensation.164  The Court then 
proceeded to identify the significant factors from previous regulatory 
takings cases: the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant 
(especially with regards to the claimant’s distinct investment-backed 
expectations), the nature of the governmental action, whether the 
governmental action is reasonably necessary to effect a substantial public 
purpose, and whether the government action can be characterized as the 
acquisition of a resource to facilitate a uniquely public function.165 
Many of these questions raised in a Penn Central analysis have 
already been addressed in prior tiers of takings analysis.  The character of 
governmental action is part of the substantial nexus question raised in the 
legitimate government interest or due process analysis that the Court 
determined was not part of a takings analysis.166  It is redundant to apply 
these same tests especially to a water right in which value is entirely 
dependent on the right of use.  Therefore, there is no need to balance 
whether the property owner retains any value since taking the use right 
takes everything.  
                                                           
cable television access to private property was a taking; but c.f. Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (the Penn Central Court did not find 
a taking when the historic preservation law forbade the construction of an office 
building on private property). The latter situation was not a taking and yet had a much 
greater impact on the property owner). 
161. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104. 
162. Id. at 130–36. 
163. Id. at 123. 
164. Id. at 124. 
165. Id. at 124–28. 
166. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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The Penn Central analysis is pre-Lucas, pre-Dolan and pre-Lingle 
where the Court clarified several of the tiers of takings analysis.  The 
Lucas case clearly refined the second tier of per se takings situations, 
which is whether there is categorical taking.  Perhaps it is time to collapse 
the multi-factor balancing test into the second and third tiers of analysis 
where it seems to belong, especially in the case of takings analysis 
involving western water rights.  As a fourth-tier inquiry, the multi-factor 
test is somewhat circular. 
 Under the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test, the outcome 
would depend upon an ad hoc, case by case, factual analysis.  In Lingle, 
however, the Court resurrected dormant language from older cases and 
stated, “One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is ‘to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.’”167  The Court has also stated, “A strong public desire to improve 
the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for change.”168  Such language 
indicates that the Court is resurrecting the principles embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment.  The result of the Court’s renewed resolve to apply the Fifth 
Amendment more rigorously means that the ad hoc inquiry performed by 
lower courts may face a higher level of scrutiny by the Supreme Court in 
the future.  Therefore, if the lower courts applied takings analyses with 
consistency, there may no longer by what seems to be such an ad hoc 
approach to takings cases from the lower courts up to the Supreme Court. 
Any government action or regulation that denies an owner use of 
an appropriative water right without compensation is subject to a takings 
challenge.  Such regulations as the Endangered Species Act, wetlands 
regulations, water quality regulations, or any other government regulation 
that denies a water rights holder the use of an appropriative water right, 
are most likely a per se taking of the water right without compensation. 
Many will agree that most if not all of these regulations provide 
some public benefit; however that is not a criterion used to determine a 
taking.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist said, the desire to improve public 
conditions does not justify circumventing the “constitutional way” of 
                                                           
167. Id. at 536–37 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
168. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (citing 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)). 
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paying the property owner.169  The Fifth Amendment acknowledges that 
private property can be taken for a public purpose, but only if just 
compensation is paid. 
 
IV. DO BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF STATE LAW OR THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE ALLOW THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT TO TAKE WATER RIGHTS WITHOUT 
COMPENSATION? 
 
 The public trust doctrine has been touted as the best means to 
justify limitations on water rights without the need for compensation for 
water rights holders.170  The theory is that public rights under the public 
trust doctrine pre-date all appropriative water rights and therefore have 
priority under the prior rights doctrine.  Of course, public use advocates 
would rather not have to pay, and the public trust doctrine provides a trump 
of existing rights, assuming the doctrine can be demonstrated to apply to 
the waters in question and to include the public uses being advocated.  But 
the common law public trust doctrine was always limited to navigation 
and fishing in navigable waters.  While a few courts have expanded both 
the protected public uses and the affected waters the doctrine remains of 
limited scope in most states.171  Thus, justifying constraints on water rights 
for other public purposes and on non-navigable waters requires that courts 
effectively amend that longstanding common law doctrine.  A taking 
without compensation could also result from the Endangered Species Act 
as occurred in Tulare and Casitas, if courts view wetlands regulations 
legislation, or water quality regulation as mere implementations of 
preexisting public rights.   
This redefinition of property rights via the “discovery” of pre-
existing or somehow superior public rights is often justified by the asserted 
importance of protecting the environment and public health.  But such 
justification flies in the face of the Fifth Amendment, which does not make 
exceptions based on the perceived importance of the public purpose.  
                                                           
169.  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396. 
170. Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law 
Development in California, 1850–1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource 
Allocation in Nineteenth-Century America, LAW & SOC’Y REV. 10, Winter 1976, at 
236, 36. 
171. E.g., Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). 
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Indeed, where the public purpose is thought to be particularly important, 
compensation for the taking of private property rights should be least 
controversial.  The primary inquiry is not based on the quality of the public 
benefit: the primary inquiry revolves around the issue of whether a 
property holder was divested of property without compensation.   
Clearly, under common law, a property owner may not be 
compensated for an act that is considered a nuisance.  In such 
circumstances there are private law remedies and the government has the 
police power to regulate nuisances on private property.  Uses causing 
harms that must be compensated for under nuisance law and which the 
state can therefore regulate are uses the property owner never had a right 
to engage in.  Their prohibition by regulation takes nothing.  The same is 
true for similar regulations of use of water rights if there was a common 
law nuisance such as pollution or flooding––two unlawful invasions of 
another owner’s property.  In cases of nuisance, the property owner does 
not warrant compensation. 
As a result of the Fifth Amendment, some legal commentators 
have tried to formulate a way around the compensation issue.  Their basic 
argument is that public policy to protect the environment will not advance 
if the public must compensate property owners for what is to be taken from 
them.  Some commentators argue this shift in emphasis from private rights 
in water to public rights in water will provide “opportunities for change” 
to address environmental goals of increasing instream flows.172 
The argument against compensating water rights holders for rights 
taken by the government is faulty in two ways: first, it would be 
unconstitutional and second, the argument is based on flawed public policy 
philosophy.  The next section will address the flawed public policy 
inherent within a water rights system that would decrease private rights in 
water while increasing so-called public rights.    
 
V. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST CREATING 
PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER 
 
Some legal commentators have argued that as a result of 
increasing demand for water rights, both consumptive and non-
                                                           
172. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of 
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 258 (1990). 
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consumptive, the law needs to recognize public rights in water.173  Lynda 
Butler argues that the public interest needs to be recognized as a property 
right.174  Joseph Sax argues that as times are changing and as we move 
towards fundamentally different water strategy, the primary question is to 
what extent claims of vested property rights will constrain opportunities 
for change.175  Fundamental to these arguments for public rights in water 
is the belief that private rights will not lead to environmental health.  
Therefore, the government must intervene and divine the public interest 
that needs protection.  
 Even accepting that this is true, it does not alter the takings 
analysis.  The point of the Takings Clause is a recognition that sometimes 
the pursuit of the public interest requires a taking of property rights, which 
is allowed when compensation is paid.  But the assumption that 
environmental objectives will only be achieved by constraining property 
rights, or that private property owners will not take measures to protect the 
environment, is incorrect.    
 Private property owners have strong incentives to protect the 
environment where doing so preserves or enhances the value of their 
property.  While it is certainly true that some uses of property have harmful 
impacts on the environment, environmental stewardship is unlikely to be 
the result of uncompensated takings.  Rather the threat of uncompensated 
taking creates incentives for property owners to extract other values before 
a regulation is imposed.  While it is possible for environmental interests to 
acquire properties from those who would engage in environmentally 
harmful activities, market failures often create obstacles to such 
transactions.  In such cases regulation is the appropriate remedy, but not 
without compensation.  If one can acquire through regulation without 
compensation what might otherwise have been accomplished through 
purchase, regulation will always be the preferred option.  And it will come 
at the expense of property owners rather than at the expense of the public 
beneficiaries. 
 In addition to finding the most cost-effective approach to 
environmental protection, we should be equally concerned to respecting 
                                                           
173. Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept 
of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323 (1990). See generally, Sax, supra note 172; 
Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water 
Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990). 
174. Butler, supra note 173, at 326. 
175. Sax, supra note 172, at 258. 
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the mandates of the U.S. Constitution––including the separation of 
powers.  In an eminent domain proceeding the determination of whether 
the cost of property acquisition is offset by the benefits to the public rests 
with the elected executive and legislative authorities.  But when the 
question is raised in an inverse condemnation or takings action in court, 
the policy choice falls to often unelected judges.  In the context of water 
rights, as discussed supra, at least one court has called beneficial use “an 
evolving concept” that “can be expanded to reflect changes in society’s 
recognition of the value of new uses of our resources.”176 But the courts 
have no particular expertise in divining the public interest and, at least at 
the federal level, they are not democratic institutions.  A takings doctrine 
requiring courts to balance individual interests against those of the public 
is a prescription, indeed a mandate, for judicial policy making.  The Penn 
Central balancing approach effectively requires courts to make 
substantive decisions of what is the public interest.  Such policy making 
by the courts should concern advocates of individual freedom as well as 
advocates of democratic government.  Under the American system of 
government, the legislature (or the people acting directly) is, by definition, 
the final arbiter of the public interest.  Courts should adhere to their 
constitutionally-prescribed duty to enforce the law that, among other 
things, includes enforcing the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 
The foregoing analysis of takings law as it applies to water rights 
suggests an approach that will insulate the courts from straying beyond their 
constitutional role into policy making.  If all regulations of water use are 
understood to be physical takings, the per se rule of Loretto applies and 
there is no need for courts to engage in the balancing of private rights and 
the public interest.  
It is a common misconception that every citizen benefits from his 
share of the public lands and the resources found thereon.  Public ownership 
of many natural resources lies at the root of resource control conflicts.  With 
public ownership resources are held in common; that is, they are owned by 
everyone and, therefore, can be used by everyone.  But public ownership 
by no means guarantees public benefits.  Individuals make decisions 
regarding resource use, not large groups or societies.  Yet, with government 
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control, it is not the owners who make decisions, but politicians and 
bureaucrats.  The citizen as beneficiary is often a fiction.177 
 Other economists have argued that some resources––such as air, 
water, and sea resources––have eluded market processes because of the 
difficulty to define and enforce property interests in those resources.  
Without a property rights system that establishes clear, definable property 
interests, the “tragedy of the commons” results, as commonly happens 
when a natural resource is supposedly valued by the many, but owned by 
none.178  These economists further argue that “the challenge in tackling 
these tougher problems is to devise property rights regimes that can move 
us out of the political arena and into the market where individuals face 
opportunity costs of their actions.”179 Leal has stated: 
 
In fact, private individuals and organizations are probably 
doing more to preserve the environment than the federal 
government.  For one thing, the majority of the prime 
habitat for wildlife exists on fertile and low-lying areas 
where most of the farms, ranches and private forests are, 
not in the mountains and grasslands that the government 
owns.  For another, while the government can set aside 
land as wilderness, national parks, and wildlife refuges, 
government officials have less motivation to make sure 
that the land they oversee is well cared for and that its use 
does not harm others.180 
 
 Similarly, the authors of this article advocate providing private 
citizens with the means to value the resources instead of relying on the 
government’s guesstimates in response to political pressures.  In order to 
allow citizens the means to value the water resource, there needs to be a 
refinement of the present western water law prior appropriations system 
that fully establishes clearly definable interests in water rights.  Critical to 
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178. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, supra note 8, at 161. 
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this system is enforcement of the Fifth Amendment’s protection of 
property rights. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In her dissenting opinion to the Kelo decision, Justice O’Connor 
stated the Constitution establishes two conditions on the government’s 
exercise of eminent domain: “the taking must be for a ‘public use’ and 
‘just compensation’ must be paid to the owner.”181  Additionally she wrote: 
These two limitations serve to protect the “security of Property,” which 
Alexander Hamilton described to the Philadelphia Convention as one of 
the “great obj[ects] of Gov[ernment].”182   Together they ensure stable 
property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive, 
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s eminent domain power—
particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, may be 
unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority’s 
will.183 In the case of water rights, which deserve the same protection as 
other real property rights in the West, but are also different in that they are 
usufructuary rights, or only use rights, it is even more important that the 
courts provide constitutional protections to water rights.  If the government 
can acquire through regulation without compensation what might 
otherwise have been accomplished through paying just compensation, 
government regulation will always be the preferred option.  And it will 
come at the expense of property owners rather than at the expense of public 
beneficiaries. Such an outcome would be a violation of “security of 
Property” as articulated by Alexander Hamilton, and as cited by Justice 
O’Connor in Kelo. 
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